South Sudan: The newest riparian & a postcolonial shift in Nile Hydropolitics?

 Link from Sudan blog post and brief introduction about South Sudan to talk 

We move into the final blog post of this series, and it is fitting that we have ended up at the most upstream riparian in the final post. This final post will cover not only the newest riparian of the Nile, but also (to date) the newest sovereign state: South Sudan, having achieved independence in January 2011 from Sudan. In one regard, monitoring South Sudan's novel independent strategy of management the Nile's waters could be integral towards further progress into an equitable arena of shared water resources in a postcolonial Nile Basin (Farah and Opanga 2017). South Sudan is the only riparian to have emerged into a scenario where, legislatively at least, hydro-hegemonies have been eradicated, unlike many other riparians who emerged in the midst of the 1959 Nile Water Agreement. While this does empower South Sudan in achieving its independent hydraulic objectives, it also allows more sustainable legislative management. 

While it was not a huge barrier to independence, the legacy of Sudan is felt in legislative boundaries of water management in South Sudan, particularly through an inhibition from the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement). In one sense, South Sudan has sought to balance its own water allocations with assurances over preventing water controversy. For instance, to counter their inhibition from the CPA with Sudan, the CFA in South Sudan has considered existing upstream water uses in its policy-making. This is indicative of South Sudanese leaders acknowledging the potential of jeopardy in their novel self-determination becoming entangled with hydropolitical tension, making sense of their legislative recognition of water controversy in their domestic water policy direction (Salman 2011). 

However, one area in which South Sudan is arguably being taken advantage of in its novelty is through the 'Jonglei Canal' project. In one regard, South Sudan is building canals to take advantage of their empowerment in the 'decolonised' hydropolitical arena in the Nile Basin.  The 'Jonglei Canal' is the first of these projects, diverting water away from the wetlands, so that flooding decreases and more water flows downstream. However, as the attached video highlights, this comes at a detriment to South Sudanese communities, while downstream countries (particularly Egypt) benefit, which comprises a potential return to downstream domination over the upstream riparians. 

(above) A video indicating both the environmental and social hazards of the Jonglei Canal system to South Sudan and the wider region.

Drying up the Sudd means destroying an entire wetland ecosystem, which comes at a greater socio-environmental detriment to South Sudanese development than the benefits from 'saving' water. Away from the Nile, we can look at the case of the Aral Sea in Central Asia as an example of irrigation ruining ecosystems. In many ways, the video highlights how it is an Egyptian-led scheme to ensure more water flows downstream so that Egypt averts disparities, indicating an inhibition to independent South Sudanese water strategies and a persistence of downstream hegemonies in Nile water management.

In many ways, the scheme seems to hinder the progression of postcolonial development along the Nile, as it seemingly reinstates Egypt's power in negotiations over upstream riparians.

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