Herding the Nile Basin with the GERD? Ethiopia's new Hydro-Hegemony in Action

In the last blog post, we discovered how wider political contexts in a country has direct impacts not only on its domestic hydropolitics, but also affects the wider hydrological sphere. Moving on from this, it becomes crucial to look at how Ethiopia has managed to gain and sustain its new political hydropower by 'exploiting its bargaining power' to achieve its own goals, under the guise of mutual benefit across the Nile Basin.

(above) A video to highlight the Ethiopia's hydraulic projects being both mutually beneficial for Ethiopia and Sudan, while also perpetuating disputes.

 One integral case that we must look at in this context is to look at the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the biggest hydrological infrastructural project in the Nile's recent history. It is common to analyse the GERD as a catalyst of change, as its construction is likely to pursue further economic growth for Ethiopia, and wider multilateral trade and economic activity between the riparian states. However, given we have looked at the wider context of Ethiopian hydropolitics, it is fundamental to understand the GERD as a direct outcome of change, particularly of shifting and complex changing multilateral cooperation processes along the Basin (Cascao and Nicol 2016). As discussed, the foreground to GERD was a result of cooperation between riparian states to develop hydraulic infrastructure along the Blue Nile, in an Eastern Nile Basin that has been plagued by hydropolitical conflict and complexity. Further from this, as we discuss the 'past' and 'present' of GERD analysis, it is crucial to conduct of the GERD as a cause of further change, incorporating the 'future' in our analysis.

While the GERD is Ethiopia-centric, it is a part of a wider phenomenon of change, determined through an increased capacity of upstream countries to influence transboundary negotiations. The upstream has been empowered to a greater degree, though it is fundamental to recognise that this is coupled with downstream countries losing their share of power. In this regard, it is in terms of bargaining power that this regional power balance shift becomes more relevant, as there is more equitable multilateral management through power sharing and in negotiations, with the formerly disempowered upstream countries now having the power to influence the processes and outcomes of negotiation (Zeitoun et al. 2011). Alongside their increased hydropower, annual GDP growth in Ethiopia has been around 10% into the turn of the century, which has increased capacity to meet wider national economic demands, alongside a substantial increase in FDI (Arsano 2007). This increased economic and financial capital has solidified Ethiopia as the regional economic hegemon in the Eastern Nile Basin, which not only gives the government greater capacity to project its economic and political power, but also begins to be transferred into greater hydropolitical capital. 

In the next post, we will shift our focus across the power continuum in the Nile Basin, from the arguable current hegemon to the historical hydro-hegemon in the region: Egypt. The previous two blog posts have looked at how Ethiopia has been able to manipulate its advantageous position alongside transition into a more stable government with high levels of economic growth to spearhead its hegemonic power. However, at the same time, it is fundamental to look at how the opposite has happened in Egypt: how political instability and internal turmoil has translated to its diminishing riparian voice in negotiations and hydropower in the Nile Basin. In our further analysis, we will begin to weigh up, whether the power shift and water sharing in the Nile is more as a consequence of growing Ethiopian authority, or the diminishing Egyptian hegemony.